内容简介
In this title, two renowned political scientists make the contrarian, research-based case that – regardless of any other factors political scientists or historians may find relevant – the calculations and actions of rulers are the driving force of all politics, and the primary goal of rulers is to maintain power as long as possible. In this clever and accessible book, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith introduce us to their perspective of the political world. They bare the logic of politics, starting from the simple premise that leaders pursue their own ends, and that populations either have, or more often don’t have, the power to constrain them to a significant degree. The book is organized by a series interconnected questions, among them: Why do leaders who wreck their countries keep their jobs for so long? Why do autocracies have dismal economic policies? How are there so many suffering people in resource-rich lands? Why do ‘natural disasters’ disproportionately strike poor nations? Why do ‘evil-doers’ so often collect loads of foreign aid? Why are democracies so good at war? In answering these questions, the authors look at politics, the choices of public policies, and even decisions about war and peace as lying outside of conventional thinking about culture and history. They set aside ideas of civic virtue and psychopathology. Such notions simply are not central to understanding what leaders do and why they do it. Instead, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith see politicians as self-interested louts, just the sort of people you wouldn’t want to have over for dinner, but without whom you might not have dinner at all. And from this perspective, they are able to answer some perplexing mysteries of politics, shed light on what we read in the newspapers every single day, and offer realistic ways of improving human governance.
About the Author
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita is the Julius Silver Professor of Politics and director of the Alexander Hamilton Center for Political Economy at New York University. He is the author of 16 books, including The Predictioneer’s Game.Alastair Smith is professor of politics at New York University. The recipient of three grants from the National Science Foundation and auth…
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About the Author
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita is the Julius Silver Professor of Politics and director of the Alexander Hamilton Center for Political Economy at New York University. He is the author of 16 books, including The Predictioneer’s Game.Alastair Smith is professor of politics at New York University. The recipient of three grants from the National Science Foundation and author of three books, he was chosen as the 2005 Karl Deutsch Award winner, given biennially to the best international relations scholar under the age of 40.
目录
Introduction Rules to Rule By Chapter 1 – The Rules of Politics Three Political Dimensions Virtues of 3 – D Politics Change the Size of Dimensions and Change the World Rules Ruling Rulers Taxing Shuffling the Essential Deck Do the Rules Work in Democracies? Chapter 2 – Coming to Power Paths to Power with Few Essentials Speed Is Essential Pay to Play Mortality: The Best Opportunity for Power Inheritance and the Problem of Relatives Papal Bull – ying for Power Seizing Power from the Bankrupt Silence Is Golden Institutional Change Coming to Power in Democracy Democratic Inheritance Democracy Is an Arms Race for Good Ideas Coalition Dynamics A Last Word on Coming to Power: The Ultimate Fate of Sergeant Doe Chapter 3 – Staying in Power Governance in Pursuit of Heads The Perils of Meritocracy Keep Essentials Off-Balance Democrats Aren’t Angels Bloc Voting Leader Survival Chapter 4 – Steal from the Poor, Give to the Rich Taxation Tax Collectors Privatized Tax Collection Extraction Borrowing Debt Forgiveness Chapter 5 – Getting and Spending Effective Policy Need Not Be Civic Minded Bailouts and Coalition Size Is Democracy a Luxury? Public Goods Not for the Public’s Good Who Doesn’t Love a Cute Baby? Clean Drinking Water Building Infrastructure Public Goods for the Public Good Earthquakes and Governance Chapter 6 – If Corruption Empowers, Then Absolute Corruption Empowers Absolutely Power and Corruption Private Goods in Democracies Private Goods in Small Coalition Settings Wall Street: Small Coalitions at Work Dealing with Good Deed Doers Cautionary Tales: Never Take the Coalition for Granted Discretionary Money Chapter 7 – Foreign Aid The Political Logic of Aid The Impact of Aid An Assessment of Foreign Aid Aid Shakedowns Fixing Aid Policy Nation Building Chapter 8 – The People in Revolt To Protest or Not To Protest Nipping Mass Movements in the Bud Protest in Democracy and Autocracy Shocks Raise Revolts Are Disasters Always Disasters for Government Survival? Responding to Revolution or Its Threat Power to the People Chapter 9 – War, Peace, and World Order War Fighting To Try Hard or Not Fighting for Survival Who Survives War The Peace Between Democracies Defending the Peace and Nation Building Chapter 10 – What Is To Be Done? Rules to Fix By Lessons from Green Bay Fixing Democracies Removing Misery Free and Fair Elections: False Hope Acknowledgments · · · · · · (收起)
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